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vs.
Estate of E U G E N E T I F T O N
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Case No.
14027

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF
T H E N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
Barbara Jean Madsen and Barbara Jean Madsen
as Guardian ad Litem of Deborah Jean Moffit, a
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minor, respond to an appeal made by the Appellants
from a Summary Judgment which was granted in
favor of the Respondents by the Third Judicial District Court, in and for the County of Salt Lake, State
of Utah. This appeal is brought for the determination
of the ownership of the proceeds of an insurance policy
on the life of Eugene Tifton Moffit, J r . deceased, between his first wife and the minor child of that marriage, and his second wife and the minor child of the
second marriage.

DISPOSITION IN T H E L O W E R COURT
Respondents, Barbara Jean Madsen and Barbara
Jean Madsen as Guardian d Litem of Deborah Jean
Moffit, a minor, brought this action against Appellants
and the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States to determine the ownership and right to receive
the proceeds of Group Life Insurance Policy No.
12560. After paying the policy proceeds into the Court,
the insurance company was dismissed as a party. Appelants and Respondents filed motions for summary
judgment based on the pleadings, attached exhibits and
stipulation of the facts. After a hearing on the motions and memoranda of authorities submitted by both
parties, the Court below granted the motion of Respondents and denied the motion of Appellants.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to affirm the judgment of the
District Couit of the Third Judicial District in which
summary judgment was granted in their favor as a
matter of law.

STATEMENT OF T H E FACTS
Eugene Tifton Moffit, Jr., the insured and now
decedent in this matter, and Barbara Jean Madsen,
Respondent, were married on December 23, 1955. During the course of that marriage, one child was born to
the parties, Deborah Jean Moffit, on February 27,
1957. During the course of the marriage, Mr. Moffit
was employed by Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company (Mountain Bell), being hired by
Mountain Bell on November 22, 1955, and continued
to be employed there until the time of his death on
July 16, 1974. Approximately two years after the marriage of the parties, Eugene Tifton Moffit, Jr., enrolled with his employer, Mountain Bell, for certain insurance benefits through his employer's carrier, The
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States
(Equitable). On January 15, 1958, Equitable agreed
to insure the life of Eugene Tifton Moffit, Jr., under
the terms of a Group Insurance Policy No. 12560.
This group insurance policy which Mr. Moffit obtained provided that the proceeds of said life insurance
policy would be based to the nearest $1,000.00 of his
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annual gross salary at the time of his death. Said policy
provided for an escalation clause based on the variable
amounts of the insured's wages paid him by his employer. The proceeds of said policy would be paid in
accordance to the nearest $1,000.00 of the insured's
salary at the time of his death, whether the wages be
higher or lower than at the time of the enrollment in
the insurance policy.
Subsequently, on February 1, 1967, while still an
employee of Mountain Bell and still married to Barbara
Jean Madsen, Mr. Moffitt enrolled with Equitable for
Supplementary Life Insurance for the group insurance
policy he initially enrolled in on January 1, 1958. Said
Supplementary Life Insurance Rider to the group insurance policy provided supplemental life insurance to
his original policy in the same amount, again based on
a proportionate sliding scale to the nearest $1,000.00 of
his annual gross income at the time of his death. Thereafter, the proceeds of the Group Insurance Policy No.
12560 enrolled in by Mr. Moffitt with Equitable
through his employer, Mountain Bell, amounted to
twice his annual gross salary to the nearest $1,000.00.
On December 7, 1967, the Respondent, Barbara
Jean Madsen, and Eugene Tifton Moffit, Jr., the decedent, were granted an interlocutory Decree of Divorce
by the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. 174352, which
Decree of Divorce was final on March 6, 1968. The
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Decree of Divorce incorporated a P r o p e r t y Settlement
Stipulation in which the Respondent. Barbara Jean
Madsen, and E u g e n e Tifton Moffit. J r . . the decedent,
executed on U< foher 13, 1967. On page 2, paragraph 3
of the Stipulation, there u e r e made certain provisions
I '- the designation <«f beneficiaries under the group
insurance policy ,V-. l : *M». \» 1 id **ead as follows:
*3. J
ir* and agrees
t o mu
j.- ran ; : , . ^ «ii,* . r^xt the life insurance he presently maintains through group
coverage in connection with his employment for
the benefit of plaintiff and the minor child, and
in addition, to maintain health and accident insurance through such group coverage for the
benefit of the minor dniigrH'. v <t;" I he parties."
On December •; «>• , !he date the I Mvorce Decree
was entered, E u g e n e iV'lcn Moffit, J
the decedent.
'»•*"' employed by Mountain Hell and \* as still enrolled
-.•!. his Group Insurance Policy A* 12/WJO and the
Supplemental Insurance Rider with the Imputable Life
Assurance Society of the United States. \ t the dale
of the Divorce Decree, -!u ndi^; . InTi ui the parties
Deborah J e a n Moffit, was ten years old
un ^iarch 6, 1968, the inteiioci i tory Decree of
Divorce between the Respondent, Barbara J e a n Madsen, and the decedent, Kaigene Tifton Moffit, J r . , was
final. Approximately two months after the divorce was
final, on Ma\ 28, IJMiH, Ilic decedent -HI AHkm (..
Mnffil were married ,M i Moffit c.*ni»Iin = ^ d his employ-
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ment with Mountain Bell, and on June 11, 1968, he
executed a change of beneficiary on his Group Life
Insurance Policy No. 12560 and the Supplemental Insurance Rider, changing the beneficiaries from Barbara
Jean Moffit, the Respondent, who is now known as
Barbara Jean Madsen, to that of Arlene C. Moffit,
his then present wife.
Eugene Tifton Moffit, Jr., the decedent, died intestate on July 16, 1974. At the time of his death he
was married to Arlene C. Moffit and had been in the
continuous employment of Mountain Bell since November 22, 1955 until the date of his death. Group Insurance Policy No. 12560 of Equitable Life Insurance
Society of the United States and the Supplemental
Rider to the policy were still in force and fully maintained on the date of his death, and the named beneficiary under said Policy and Rider was Arlene C. Moffit. At the date of Mr. Moffit's death, his annual gross
salary was $16,500.00, and under the terms of the insurance policy referred to above, the nearest $1,000.00
amount would be $17,000.00. With the supplemental
insurance rider, the total proceeds from the insurance
policy maintained by the decedent would be the amount
of $34,000.00. A t the time of decedent's death, the
minor child of the marriage between Barbara Jean Madsen and the decedent, Deborah Jean Moffit, was a minor,
being seventeen years of age.
Upon the death of Eugene Tifton Moffit, Jr.,
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Mountain Bell paid a discretionary death benefit to the
decedent's wife, Arlene C. Moffit, in the amount of his
annual gross salary, which at that time was $16,500.00.
Said death benefit was paid without consideration of
the insurance policy which is the subject of this controversy.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E INSURANCE PROVISION OF T H E
DIVORCE D E C R E E SHOULD BE ENFORCE D AS I T I S S T A T E D W I T H O U T L I M I T A TION AND MODIFICATION
BY
THE
COURT.
The Appellants have asserted that the provisions
relating to life insurance in the Property Settlement
Stipulation in the Divorce Decree of the decedent and
Barbara Jean Madsen should be subject to reinterpretation, modification and limitation by this Court. In support of this theory, they state the basic rules of law
supporting the fact that the Court must support the
intentions of the contracting parties to the Property
Settlement Stipulation. The Appellants argument is
made under what appears to be a tacit understanding
that the intention of the contracting parties is not clear
from the Property Settlement Stipulation, and there-
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fore they suggest to the Cour several interpretations
that might or should be made by the Court.
The Respondents would assert that the intention of
the parties is clear and unambiguous by virtue of the
writing in the Property Settlement Stipulation which
was subsequently incorporated into the Decree of Divorce by the District Court. That provision plainly
states that the decedent was to maintain life insurance
through his employment for the benefit of the Respondent, the minor child. It did not say that it was only in
support of an obligation for child support and is binding only so long as the child support payments are due
and payable. Again, it did not say that the intention of
the parties was that the insurance policy was maintained
to provide additional child support payments other than
those required in the Divorce Decree. I t is the position
of the Respondents that the contractual obligation entered into between the decedent and Respondent was
straight forward, clear and unambiguous.
The obligation that the decedent voluntarily entered
into was that of providing life insurance coverage
through his place of employment on behalf of Respondent, Deborah Jean Moffit, without limitation as to
length of time or in connection with or in support of
any other provision of the Property Settlement Stipulation. The policy was clearly identified and remained
the same policy during the entire tenure of the decedent
with Mountain Bell, Equitable Group Policy No. 12560.
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The policy was not designated or limited to a monetary amount, because the parties realized it could not
be as the policy benefits were subject to variation by
the very nature of the terms of the policy itself. The
parties treated the insurance policy just like the other
aspects of the property awarded to the Respondent. The
Appellant, Arlene C. Moffit, neither contributed to the
maintenance of said policy or to the child support of
the minor child Respondent. Additionally, the Divorce
Court did not order this provision in its own right, but
merely incorporated the voluntary provisions of the
Property Settlement Stipulation contracted by the
parties. This precautionary measure taken by the parties
to protect the minor child proved to be well founded
as at the time of the decedent's death, Deborah Jean
Moffit was still a minor and in need of the sustenance
that the policy would provide.
In this instance, the decedent and the Respondent,
Barbara Jean Madsen, entered into a Property Settlement Stipulation prior to a Decree of Divorce voluntarily and with the purpose of dividing their property
and providing for child support and the care and maintenance of the minor child of their marriage. This was
done and the Court incorporated the Property Settlement Stipulation which included the insurance provision
clause. This contractual obligation entered into by both
the decedent and Respondent, Barbara Jean Madsen,
was done so voluntarily by both parties. The strength
of that Stipulation is two-fold. Not only is the Stipula9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tion binding as a contractual obligation between the
parties which was subsequently breached by the decedent, but also it has the added strength of a contractual
obligation that is incorporated into a Court order. Aside
from the sanctity of the contractual obligation and the
binding authority it has upon the decedent, this Court
has stated in Travelers Insurance Company v. Lewis,
Utah 2d
.., 531 P.2d 484 (1975), Page 485,
the following:
". . . There is ample authority to sustain the ruling of the trial Court in holding that the provisions of a Divorce Decree control the disposition
of the proceeds of an insurance policy between
contending beneficiaries.
Therefore, there is ample authority for the parties to
contractually obligate each other as to certain terms and
conditions, and it is further strengthened by a provision
that the Court incorporated it into a Decree of Divorce.
Although the Appellant has used the principles set
up by this Court in Murphy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113,
53 P . 1010 (1898), and that the same principle which
is reaffirmed in Columbo v. Walker Bank <§ Trust
Company, 26 Ut. 2d 350, 489 P.2d 998 (1971), it is
the Respondents position that the Columbo case is factually distinguishable from the case before the Court
at this time. Secondly, the guiding principles of Columbo, supra, which notes the flexibility of Section 303-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended (1973),
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would be more helpful for the Respondent in the case
at hand before the Court than it would be for the Appellant. On page 1000 in the first full paragraph, the
Court states as follows:
". . . This Court in Murphy v. Moyle took an
intermediate position which comports with the
extremely flexible standards of the Statute (Sec.
30-3-5), i.e., whether the payment of support continues after the death of the father depends upon
the nature and terms of the Decree of Divorce/'
(emphasis added)
In the Colombo case, the Appellant was trying to
deduct from the estate of the decedent the remainder of
the child support payments which would be owed to him
through the remainder of his minority. The Court
denied that factor due to the surrounding circumstances
and facts of the Divorce Decree in which the Appellant
received rather substantial sums of money and property
through the normal inheritance-heir relationship with
the decedent. Although it is the Respondents' position
that the Columbo case is distinguished factually from
the case at hand should the Court find that the guiding
principle of Columbo would apply here, the Respondent
makes the following points. Based upon the nature and
terms of the Decree of Divorce, we find the Respondent,
Deborah Jean Moffit, was seventeen years of age at
the time of her father's death. H e r father, the decedent
Eugene Tifton Moffit, Jr., died intestate with no appreciable assets in his estate. Deborah Jean Moffit re-
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ceived absolutely nothing from her father's estate by
way of inheritance, benefits or appreciation. Contrary
to the Columbo case, the Repsondent, Deborah Jean
Moffit, received no property, no other life inusrance
policies other than that which is contested in this action,
and no division of the estate of her father inasmuch as
the decedent's estate is appreciably without assets. On
the other hand in this instant case, one of the Appellants,
Arlene C. Moffit, received a discretionary death benefit from the employer of the decedent in the amount of
$16,500.00.
Under the terms of the Columbo argument, if it
applies to this case, we believe the facts indicate that
decedent would have an obligation to provide for his
minor daughter and where he entered into a contractual
obligation to do so, which was affirmed by the Divorce
Decree, that the intentions of the parties are clear that
the insurance proceeds were to be provided for the minor
child and that that obligation can be contracted for and
can be enforced by the Courts beyond the death of the
decedent.
Appellant makes further argument contending that
the Divorce Court cannot award any of the father's
property to the children beyond that which he is obligated to provide for their support. As support for this
contention they cite Laws v. Laws, (Colo. 1967), 432
P.2d 632. In that case the Colorado Trial Court required in the Divorce Decree for the provision of hav12
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ing a life insurance policy on behalf of the minor children of the parties. That case is factually distinguishable from the case at hand before the Court in the following particulars.
1. The Colorado decision was based upon the Colorado Statutes/C.R.S. 1963, 46-1-5 (3), which reads as
follows:
(3) "The Court shall have the power to require
security to be given to insure enforcement of its
orders, in addition to other methods of enforcing
Court orders now or hereafter prescribed by Statute o by Rules of Civil Procedure."
The above statute which is the foundation of Laws
V. Laws, supra, severely limits the Court as to the type
of action that the Court can take and that is only as to
"security" to insure the enforcement of it's order.
2. In the above Colorado decision, the defendant
and insured was forced by the Court involuntarily to
maintain life insurance policies on behalf of the minor
children of the marriage. That is not the case at hand
wherein Eugene Tifton Moffit, Jr., voluntarily contracted in a Property Settlement Stipulation to maintain Deborah Jean Moffit as a beneficiary under his
life insurance policy. The Court then merely incorporated that voluntary contractual agreement into the Divorce Decree.
3. The jurisdiction of the District Court in the
13
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State of Utah is based upon Section 30-3-5, supra, which
provides greater flexibility and latitude than the Colorado statute did in Laws v. Laws.
"30-3-5 U.C.A. D I S P O S I T I O N O F P R O P E R T Y A N D C H I L D R E N . When a Decree
of Divorce is made, the Court may make such
orders in relation to the children, property and
parties, and the maintenance of the parties and
children as may be equitable. The Court shall
have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the
support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and their support and maintenance, or the distribution of the property as
shall be reasonable and necessary."
The distinction between the Colorado statutes and
the appropriate Utah statute and the factual circumstances surrounding Laws v. Laws, supra, and the case
before the Court at this time are too far at variance to
be controlling.
The Appellant also cites Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah
259, 240 P.2d 1211 (1952) as controlling the Court in
it's interpretation of the case at hand. I t would be the
position of the Respondent that again the facts distinguish Dixon v. Dixon, supra, from the case at hand in
view of the fact the defendant was required by the Court
to have insurance policies to protect his indebtedness to
the Plaintiff in regard to certain title aspects of real
property involved in the divorce. Although there are
other issues involved in Dixon, we believe the most dis14
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tinguishing factor here is that the lower Court required
that an insurance policy be maintained to secure the
debts, whereas in the case at hand the parties voluntarily
entered into a Stipulation for the provision of insurance
for the minor child. No mention is made here in the
Property Settlement Stipulation or in the Decree of
Divorce that said insurance policy was to be made for
the protection of the child support payments or for any
other obligation of the decedent to the minor child or to
the first wife.
Respondent would assert that the provisions of the
Property Settlement Stipulation entered into by the
parties should be enforced as it is written by the parties,
in view of the fact that the parties voluntarily entered
into that contractual obligation, and the Court ratified
that voluntary contract in the Divorce Decree. Inasmuch as the decedent violated that contractual obligation
and Court order, this Court should require that the proceeds of the insurance policy should go to the Respondents. As the Court has the jurisdiction and authority
to order the same, and the nature and terms of the
Decree are not adverse to one another, and without the
same the Respondent, Deborah Jean Moffit, would receive nothing by way of an inheritance, legacy or asset
from the decedent, her father. Additionally, the question
that is brought up in this aspect of the Appellant's argument has been settled by this Court in Travelers v.
Lewis, supra, and that the question has been met and
answered in favor of the Respondents.
15
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POINT II
R E S P O N D E N T S A R E E N T I T L E D TO
T H E F U L L PROCEEDS OF T H E INSURANCE POLICY INCLUDING T H E INCREASE D AMOUNT FROM T H E D A T E OF DIV O R C E A S T H E I N C R E A S E I S I N ACCORDANCE W I T H T H E POLICY PROVISIONS
A N D W A S C O N T E M P L A T E D B Y T H E CONTRACTING P A R T I E S AND T H E COURT
DECREE.
The Appellants in this case assert that since the insurance policy maintained by the decedent since the
divorce from the Respondent, Barbara Jean Madsen,
has increased from the date of the divorce of December
7, 1967, until the death of the decedent, Eugene Tifton
Moffitt, Jr., on July 16, 1974, that the Respondent
should be precluded from any of the proceeds of that
increase in the insurance policy. The argument might
have validity had the amount of the insurance policy
been fixed at the time of the divorce and that the parties
neither contemplated nor expected any after acquired
property and that there was no "expectancy" of any
unusual or predictable increase in the proceeds of that
insurance policy. However, that is not the case here.
The parties entered into their contractual obligations
under their Property Settlement Stipulation which was
incorporated into the Decree of Divorce, utilizing the
insurance policy currently then in force by the decedent
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with his employer, Mountain Bell. That policy was on
December 6, 1967, and was from the date of it's initial
enrollment on January 1, 1958, the same identical group
term insurance policy with an escalation clause which
provided that the proceeds of said life insurance policy
would be based to the nearest $1,000.00 of the annual
gross salary of the insured at the time of his death. I t
is noted in the designation in the Property Settlement
Stipulation under paragraph 3 that the clause refers to
"the insurance policy maintained by the decedent with
his employer". The description makes no mention as to
a set dollar amount of the policy. This fact is extremely
significant. The reason that the parties could not designate a fixed or set amount on the policy at the time of
the divorce was because it was contemplated by the
parties and understood by them at that time that the
amount of the insurance policy would vary according
to the decedent's annual salary at the time of his death.
Therefore, Respondents are entitled to the proceeds
of that policy at the time of the death rather than the
amount of the policy at the time of the divorce because
the policy provision provided for an escalation clause
with a variable amount of the proceeds to be paid at
the time of the death of the insured. The parties who
entered into that contractual relationship fully understood that this was what the policy provided and this
factor was contemplated by the parties when they
entered into that contract, which was later incorporated
into the Decree of Divorce by the Court.
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The Respondent is aware of the general rule of law
in regard to beneficiaries under life insurance policies
which is basically that the interest of a beneficiary is
not ordinarily a "vested right", but is a mere "expectancy" of an inchoate gift, which may be consummated
upon the death of the insured, but which is revocable at
the option of the insured during his lifetime. Jensen v.
Eddy, 30 U2d 154, 514 P2d, 1142 (1973); Wentworth
v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States, (Utah 1925) 238 P . 648; Wawman v. Citizens
National Trust and Savings Bank of Los Angeles,
(C.A. 1954) 266 P2d 48; Reliance Life Insurance Co.
of Pittsbhrg v. Jaffee, (Cal. 1953) 263 P2d 82.
However, in the case at hand, the insured entered
into a contract whereby he contracts as to who shall be
the beneficiary of the life insurance policy, he thereby
waives his right to change the beneficiarv under the life
insurance policy and converts the "expectancy interest"
of the beneficiary into a vested "equitable interest" in
the life insurance policy. Even if at a subsequent date
the insured was to change the beneficiary under the life
insurance policy, the prior named beneficiary who was
the subject of the contract would have a prior right over
any subsequent named benef iciaiy.
The above cited rule of law is cited very strongly
by a number of Courts who have faced this problem
which is directly in point with this case at hand and before the Court at this time. The District Court of Ap-
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peals in California in Waocman v. Citizens National
Trust and Savings Bank of Los Angeles, supra, indicated in a case which is factually in point where the
parties entered into a property settlement agreement
prior to a divorce wherein certain life insurance policies
were to have the parties children named as beneficiaries.
Subsequent to the divorce decree and property settlement agreement, the father of the children altered the
beneficiary under the terms of his insurance policy. Although the Court found that the father did not substantially change the beneficiary under the insurance policy,
the Court strongly supported the above rule of law
wherein it stated on page 50 the following:
"An insured by contract may waive the right to
change a beneficiary and may convert what is
usually the contingent interest of a beneficiary
of a policy of life insurance to a vested equitable
interest. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Franck, 9 Cal.
App. 2d 528, 534, 50 P2d 480; Mahony v.
Crocker, 58 Cal. App. 2d 196, 202, 136 P2d 810.
An agreement by an insured, in consideration of
the settlement of property rights by which he
covenants to make his daughter the sole heir and
irrevocable beneficiary of a policy of life insurance, vested with an equitable interest therein
which may not be defeated without her consent..."
Other jurisdictions and Courts have again upheld
this rule of law in cases that are factually in point with
the case before the Court. Reliance Life Insurance
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Company of Pittsburg v. J offee, et d, (Cal. 1953) 263
P2d 82, stated on page 84 the following:
"The interest of a beneficiary in a policy which
authorizes an alteration of its terms is not ordinarily a vested right. On the contrary, it is a mere
expectance of an inchoate gift which may be
consummated upon the death of the insured.
However, it is revocable at the option of the insured during his lifetime. Mutual Life Ins, Co.
v. Franch, 9 Cal. App. 2d 528, 537, 50 P2d 480.
But the latter may waive his right to change
beneficiary and by contracting may convert the
contingent interest into a vested equitable interest
in the policy which may not be subsequently defeated by an effort to change the beneficiary.
ChilwelVv. Chilwell, 40 Cal. App. 2d 550, 553,
105 P2d 122; Schoudy v. Schoudy, 55 Cal. App.
344, 351 203 P2d 433."
The basic rule of law which has been quoted in
Waocman v. Citizens National, supra, and Reliance Life
Ins. v. Jaffe, supra, is supported in cases of similar factual situations in the following jurisdictions and cases.
Mahony v. Crocker, et al, (Cal, 1943) 136 P2d 810;
Tivis v. Hulfey, 148 Kan. 892, 84 P2d 862 (1938);
Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v.
Franck, et al, (Cal., 1935) 50 P2d 480; Ferro v. Bologna, 334 N.Y.S .2d 856, 31 N.Y. 2d 30, 286 N . E .
2d 244 (1972).
As to the issue of the after acquired property or
the "expectancy" of the increased value of the insurance
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I

policy referred to in this case which is a result of the
escalation clause dependent upon the variable amount
of the decedent, Eugene Tifton Moffit, Jr.'s, salary, it
is the position of the Respodent that the increased
amount should be in fact a "vested equitable interest" in
the life insurance policy. That position is supported by
several jurisdictions. The California Court of Appeals
in Bernice H. Burg art v. Elizabeth M. Burgart, 5 Cal.
App. 3d 409, 85 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1970), a case that
has similar facts as to the case before the Court at
the present time. The issue as to the increased valuation of the insurane policy from the date of the property settlement agreement until the date of decedent's
death is in issue, and the Court states the following:
"The trial Court found Elizabeth M. Burgart,
the first wife, had a vested right in the entire proceeds of the policy determined on the date of
Burgart's death rather than on the property settlement agreement. The Court's findings is supported by the terms of the agreement and by
evidence at trial. Mr. Burgart agreed not to
provide a set amount of life insurance but to
maintain specific policies without changing their
coverage. The Pacific Mutual Coverage was not
for a set amount but was for the variable amount
depending upon income . . . W e must assume,
absent contrary evidence, Mr. Burgart knew of
the benefit escalation clause and contracted with
reference to it." (Emphasis Added)
As has been stated before, the Equitable Life Assurance Policy No. 12560 was a variable policy with an
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escalation clause dependent upon the decendent's salary.
I t was the same policy that had been in the hands of
the decedent from the very inception of his employment
with Mountain Bell and remained the exact same policy
until the time of his death. Both the decedent and Respondent were aware of the policy, it's terms and conditions and contracted accordingly. The Colorado Court
of Appeals has held in a case very similar in point a
similar holding, as did the California Court of Appeals,
wherein the Colorado Court in Lillian Newton v. Steven
Newton and Larree Newton, Colo. App., 472 P2d 718
(1970), stated the following:
"The face value of Cecil's [husband] coverage
under the policy was $3,000.00 more at the time
of his death than it was on the date the agreement was executed. Lillian [second wife] contends that since the parties had only the lessor
amount in mind when the agreement was signed,
the difference should belong to her as the beneficiary of record at Cecil's death. W e find no
merit in this argument. The policy involved with
the group life insurance policy in which the company, Westinghouse Electric, pays the entire
premium for all eligible employees. The amount
of coverage on each employee varied according
to his salary so that, as his salary increased, so
did his coverage under the policy. Under these
circumstances the beneficiary who was entitled
to the benefits takes them in their entirety, notwithstanding the fact that there was an increase
in the coverage since the decedent's designation
of that beneficiary."
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The Respondent is aware of only one case in which
a jurisdiction has held that the second wife should have
the increase in value in a life insurance policy, which
case has been cited by the Appellant in White v. Michigan Life Insurance Co., 43 Mich. App. 653, 204 N.W.
2d 772 (1972). The Respondent contends that the
White v. Michigan Life, supra, case is distinguished
from the case before the Court at this time in that the
Michigan Court was compelled to act under a statute
under which the Utah Court has no similar or corresponding statute in which to require it to give a decision.
The Michigan statute creates a statutory presumption
that any increased insurance proceeds would go to the
estate of the decedent unless a divorie decree specifically
designates to whom the increase should go. This obviously is not the case before the Court at this time and
should not be binding inasmuch as the decedent and
Respondent contracted for the policy provided for the
Respondents, fully aware of the possibility of an "expectancy" and that the escalation clause of the contract
could very possibly increase inasmuch as it had during
the course of their marriage up to the time of the divorce. Under the terms of the White v. Michigan Life
case, that decision turned on testimony of the parties
involved as to their consent and satisfaction with less
than the full amount of the policy and other testimony
concerning conditions and terms of the divorce decree.
In the case before the Court at this time, there is no
transcript of any proceedings or any other testimony
given, and in view of that lack of evidence as to the
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circumstances and factual situation involved, the Court
must rely upon the Property Settlement Stipulation
entered into by the parties and the Divorce Decree that
incorporated that settlement.

CONCLUSION
Respondents would respectfully submit to the Court
in conclusion that the Appellants' argument in Point I
be denied on the assumption and basis that the Property
Settlement Stipulaion in the Divorce Decree in the instant case is straight forward and unambiguous. I t
should be upheld on the basis that it is a contractual obligation of the decedent and that as such, it is binding
and enforceable, and that it has the added authority of
being incorporated as an Order of the Court. The Court
in that instance had jurisdiction under Utah law under
Section 30-3-5, Utar Code Annotated (1953), as
amended (1973), which statute has been interpreted by
this Court recently in Travelers v. Lewis, supra, and
that the facts and circumstances of this case are not
unique to take the instant case from within the purview
of the Travelers v. Lewis case. The Respondents have
distinguished the cases used by the Appellants in support of their argument under Point I, and believe that
they are factually distinguishable from the instant case
before the Court. The nature and terms of the instant
case are straight forward. The decedent died intestate
without any appreciable assets in his estate, that the

24
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Respondent, Deborah Jean Moffit, would receive nothing by way of an inheritance from her father, the decedent, and that to protect her from such a contingency,
the Respondent, Barbara Jean Madsen, and the decedent entered into a contractual obligation at the time of
the divorce to provide security for that veiy happening,
and that was done by providing the insurance proceeds
through Mountain Bell and Equitable. Therefore, those
proceeds should be given to the Respondents in accordance with the contract (Property Settlement Stipulation), that was affirmed by the lower Court.
In Point I I , the Appellants suggest that the increased valuation of the insurance policy should go to
the second wife and Appellant, Arlene C. Moffit. The
Respondents feel that the better rule of law is that the
interest given by the decedent at the time of the divorce
from the Respondent, Barbara Jean Madsen, created a
'Vested equitable interest" rather than a mere "expectancy" of an inchoate gift.
The factual circumstances surrounding the instant
case before the Court provides the basis for the Respondents' assertion to the Court that not only should
the insurance policy proceeds be awarded to the Respondents but also any increase in the policy. We have
contracting parties, the Respondent, Barbara Jean Madsen, and the decedent, entering into a Property Settlement Stipulation, mentioning a particular life insurance policy without any designation as to amount or
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limitation. The parties understood that the proceeds of
the policy would be for a variable amount based upon
the annual gross receipt of the decedent at the time of
his death and that the policy had an escalation clause
in it. There was a risk taken by the Respondent that
in fact the decedent's salary might not increase, in fact,
it could decrease. Secondly, the decedent died intestate
without any assets in his estate. The Respondent, Deborah Jean Moffit, is left without any assets and the
normal sustenance and help that a father normally gives
his child is thereby terminated. The decedent and Respondent, Barbara Jean Mdasen, contracted to provide
for that contingency and in fact they have done so, and
that to abrogate that insurance policy and the total benefits thereunder from being received by the Respondent
is to violate the intentions of the parties, the contract
in which they entered into, the resulting Court order
and the equities presented by the facts of record.
Respectfully submitted,
H O L L I S S. H U N T of
DURHAM, SWAN & H U N T
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents
510-Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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